The Shortcomings of Augustine’s Theory of Evil as Privation: Philosophical and Biblical Insufficiencies

Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) developed the privation theory of evil (privatio boni) as a cornerstone of his theodicy, arguing that evil is not a positive substance but the absence or corruption of goodness in a being that was created good by God. Drawing from Neoplatonic ideas (particularly Plotinus’s notion of matter as a kind of non-being) Augustine maintained that all creation is inherently good (omnia bona) because it proceeds from a perfectly good Creator (Confessions VII.12; City of God XI.21). Evil, therefore, has no ontological status; it is a defect, like blindness in an eye or rust on iron.

This framework allowed Augustine to preserve divine omnipotence and benevolence while accounting for moral and natural evils. Yet despite its elegance, the privation theory leaves significant philosophical and, more crucially, biblical problems unresolved.

This essay examines these shortcomings, demonstrating that Augustine’s model struggles to explain the origin, intensity, and redemptive scope of evil in light of both reason and Scripture.

Philosophical Shortcomings

Philosophically, the privation theory falters in three key areas: the origin of the privative act, the apparent positivity of evil’s effects, and the asymmetry between good and evil.

1.       The Unexplained Transition from Good to Privation
Augustine attributes the first evil to the free choice of rational creatures (angels and humans) who turn away (aversio) from the supreme Good toward lesser goods (City of God XII.1–9). Yet he insists that this turn is itself a defectus (deficiency) rather than a positive act. This creates a regress: if the will was created good, how could it defect without some prior deficiency? Augustine appeals to the mystery of free will (liberum arbitrium), but this merely relocates the problem rather than solving it. As John Hick notes, “the first evil choice is left unexplained; it is simply posited as a brute fact” (Evil and the God of Love, 1966). The privation theory thus fails to account for the causal genesis of evil without implicitly positing an uncreated propensity toward non-being, which undermines the claim that evil has no efficient cause.

2.       The Phenomenological Positivity of Evil

Evil feels substantial. Pain, malice, and destruction are not experienced as mere absences but as aggressive forces. Augustine acknowledges the intensity of suffering (e.g., the sack of Rome in 410 CE), yet reduces it to a lack of due order. This strains naivety when applied to extreme cases: the Holocaust, genocides, or natural catastrophes like the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. Privation may describe rust on metal, but it does not capture the dynamic agency of a sadistic torturer or the overwhelming presence of metastatic cancer. Critics like David Hume and contemporary philosophers of horror (e.g., Noël Carroll) argue that evil’s visceral reality demands a thicker ontology than mere negation. 

3.       Asymmetry and the Problem of Superabundant Evil
If evil is merely the absence of good, why does it so often overpower good in scale and duration? Augustine’s analogy of darkness as the absence of light works for physical phenomena, but moral evil exhibits a perverse creativity (lying, betrayal, systemic oppression) that seems to generate novel forms of disorder. The privation theory predicts that evil should be parasitic and self-limiting (since it lacks being), yet history shows evil sustaining itself across generations (e.g., hereditary slavery, intergenerational trauma). This suggests a quasi-substantiality that Augustine’s framework cannot hold without makeshift qualifications.

Biblical Problems

More damaging than philosophical gaps are the biblical tensions Augustine’s privation theory leaves unaddressed. Scripture repeatedly depicts evil in ways that resist reduction to mere absence, portraying it as a personal, cosmic, and a quasi-substantial adversary.

1.       The Personal Agency of Satan and Demons

Augustine identifies the devil’s sin as pride (superbia), a turning from God to self (City of God XIV.13). But the Bible presents Satan as a roaring lion seeking whom he may devour (1 Pet 5:8), a murderer from the beginning and father of lies (John 8:44), and the accuser of the brethren (Rev 12:10). These are not descriptions of a deficient angel but of an active, intelligent opponent with a kingdom (Matt 12:26), armor (Eph 6:11), and strategies (2 Cor 2:11). The New Testament’s exorcism narratives (Mark 5:1–20; Acts 16:16–18) treat demons as entities capable of possession, speech, and resistance; hardly mere privations that do not exist. Augustine’s attempt to subsume demonic activity under privation requires allegorizing texts that the early church read literally.

2.       The Wrath of God and the Positive Reality of Judgment

Divine wrath is not the absence of love but its active opposition to evil (Rom 1:18; Heb 12:29). The plagues of Egypt, the destruction of Sodom, and the lake of fire (Rev 20:14–15) are positive acts of retribution, not mere withdrawals of goodness. Augustine struggles to reconcile this with privation: if evil is non-being, how can God punish it without granting it ontological status? The biblical portrait of hell as eternal punishment (Matt 25:46) and outer darkness with weeping and gnashing of teeth (Matt 22:13) suggests a realm of positive torment, not a simple lack of beatitude.

3.       The Cosmic Scope of Evil and the Need for Atonement

Paul describes creation as groaning under bondage to decay (Rom 8:20–22), a subjection imposed by the will of God in response to human sin. This implies evil has infected the fabric of the cosmos, not just individual souls. Moreover, the cross is framed as a victory over principalities and powers (Col 2:15), a disarming of dark forces through Christ’s blood (Col 1:20). If evil were merely privation, why the need for such a dramatic, substitutionary act? The Levitical system, with its blood sacrifices for sin (Lev 17:11), presupposes sin as a positive debt requiring positive payment. Augustine’s privation theory flattens the legal and ontological weight of sin that the atonement narratives demand.

4.       The Persistence of Evil in Eschatology

Revelation depicts the final judgment as the casting out of evil—Satan, death, and Hades thrown into the lake of fire (Rev 20:10, 14). If evil is non-being, what exactly is being annihilated? The language of destruction (2 Thess 1:9; Matt 10:28) and second death (Rev 21:8) suggests evil has a stubborn reality that must be actively eradicated, not merely filled in like a pothole with goodness.

Conclusion

Augustine’s privation theory is a brilliant synthesis of Neoplatonism and Christian doctrine, safeguarding God’s goodness and creation’s integrity. Yet it purchases coherence at the cost of explanatory depth. Philosophically, it fails to account for evil’s origin, dynamism, and resilience. Biblically, it strains against the personal, cosmic, and material

 portraits of evil that dominate Scripture—from the serpent in Genesis to the dragon in Revelation. A more robust theodicy must integrate privation with a recognition of evil’s parasitic substantiality (as John Milbank suggests) or adopt a dramatic view (as in Irenaeus or C.S. Lewis) where evil is permitted as part of a larger narrative of conflict and redemption.

Until then, Augustine’s elegant absence leaves the screaming presence of evil inadequately addressed in an otherwise brilliant theodicy.