The Shortcomings of Augustine’s Theory of Evil as Privation: Philosophical and Biblical Insufficiencies
Augustine maintained that all creation is inherently good (omnia bona) because it proceeds from a perfectly good Creator (Confessions VII.12; City of God XI.21). Evil, therefore, has no ontological status; it is a defect, like blindness in an eye or rust on iron.
The Influence of Dualism on Augustine’s Understanding of the Problem of Evil
Although Augustine ultimately rejected Manichaean dualism, its influence lingered in his language, psychology, and metaphysics for years. This essay traces that influence across his career, showing how he gradually replaced a cosmic conflict of substances with a Christian doctrine of evil as privatio boni (privation of good), original sin, and divine grace. The analysis draws on Augustine’s own reflections in his Retractationes (Reconsiderations), where he critiques and corrects his earlier statements.
The Evolution of Augustine’s Theodicy
From the Intimate Struggles of Confessions to the Cosmic Drama of The City of God
Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) wrestled with the problem of evil more persistently and profoundly than many thinkers in the Christian tradition. His theodicy, the effort to reconcile evil’s existence with God’s goodness and omnipotence, did not emerge fully formed but developed across decades of intellectual, spiritual, and personal upheaval.